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Abstract 
 
This paper refines the Berger and Ofek (1995) methodology to approximate the market value of 
diversified firms in Australia between 1988 and 1998. Mixed evidence is found for the 
diversification discount, with diversified firms trading at a discount to single segment firms 
using an earnings-based excess value measure and at a premium employing an assets excess 
value measure. Measurement errors are identified with the earning-based excess value measure 
and refinements are presented. Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression models are applied to 
explain the variations in the diversification results. There is strong evidence for differential 
pricing of diversified firms in Australia with high performing diversified firms trading at a 
premium to single segment firms. 
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1. Introduction 
The perception of corporate diversification held by market participants has changed 
significantly over the past four decades.  From the favourable valuation premiums 
experienced by diversified firms during the 1960s, more recent research has identified 
the existence of significant valuation discounts associated with corporate diversification 
since the 1980s.  Seminal work by Lang and Stulz (1994), Berger and Ofek (1995) and 
Servaes (1996) showed that a diversified firm – a firm with two or more segments in 
unrelated industries - creates potential benefits and costs for shareholders. If the costs 
outweigh the benefits then the market will discount the share price of diversified firms 
relative to the value of non-diversified firms. Subsequent research, however, has 
questioned these findings (see for example, Graham, Lemmon and Wolf 2001; 
Maksimovic and Phillips 2001; Whited 2001) and international evidence on the 
diversification discount is mixed (Khanna and Palepu 1997, 2000; Fauver, Houston and 
Naranjo 1998; Lins and Servaes 2000). 
The international research suggests that diversified firms may be priced 
differently depending upon the  type and size of the economy. Studies of emerging 
economies show that a diversified corporate structure may enhance rather than destroy 
value. Further, there is a strong positive relationship between the diversification 
discount and poorly developed capital markets. The relative smallness of an economy 
may present conditions where corporate growth is limited unless the firm diversifies 
into unrelated markets. In these circumstances diversification may be an optimal 
structural choice by firms to maintain competitive advantage. While there is no 
empirical research to date supporting such a proposition, the history of Australian 
corporate development in the twentieth century certainly shows that most of our 
corporate leaders were diversified firms until at least the 1980s (Ville and Merrett 
2000). Given the mixed empirical evidence on the diversification discount and potential 
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for differential pricing of diversified firms across countries, analysis of Australian firms 
is warranted. This paper measures the value of corporate diversification for Australian 
firms and examines the explanatory strength of various firm specific financial factors 
that may shed light on unresolved questions. The paper is divided into 7 sections. 
Section 2 reviews literature on the  benefits and costs of diversification, and the value of 
diversified firms. Section 3 explains the Berger and Ofek (1995) method which is used 
to value diversified firms. Section 4 outlines the sample selection procedure and data 
collection. Sections 5 and 6 presents empirical results and section 7 offers conclusions. 
 
2. Literature Review 
The market value of corporate diversification in Australia will depend crucially upon 
the extent to which firms are able to balance the benefits and costs of operating a 
diversified organization. Benefits involve the ability of the firm to diversify cash flows, 
extract operational efficiencies from segments and allocate capital within the firm. Costs 
are related to the extent to which over-investment occurs, operational inefficiencies 
arise and cross-subsidization supports inefficient operations. This section reviews theory 
on these relative costs and benefits, and the empirical literature on the value of 
corporate diversification. 
 
 
2.1 Benefits: Co-insurance, operational efficiencies and internal capital markets 
The first benefit of diversification draws upon portfolio theory which states that benefits 
accrue from the aggregation of less than perfectly correlated cash flow streams from 
different business segments within a diversified firm’s portfolio of operations.  The 
inclusion of less than perfectly correlated cash flows allow the diversified firm to 
significantly reduce the variability of its cash flows over time which facilitates some 
fundamental capital budgeting objectives.  Managers are able to make better- informed 
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capital budgeting decisions as firm cash flows are subject to less variability since the 
effects of cyclical industry downturns are partially mitigated by the presence of different 
industry exposures, which are not perfectly correlated.   
Theoretically, the total variance of the diversified firm’s cash flows will be less 
than the variance of cash flows of the separate divisions standing alone.  This decrease 
in total variance, ceteris paribus culminates in the systematic risk of shareholders 
increasing whilst bondholder risk decreases due to reduction in the probability of default 
upon debt.  Consequently, the market value of conglomerate debt will be greater and so 
greater amounts of lower cost debt capital can be obtained (Lewellen, 1971).  The 
notional increase in debt capacity provides the diversified firm with the opportunity to 
take advantage of increased tax deductions of interest payments.1  Extending the issue 
of taxation further, diversified firms are able to exploit tax advantages by allowing 
financial losses of poorly performing divisions of the firm to offset potentially high tax 
liabilities of other profitable divisions.  As a result of the reduced tax liability the 
diversified firm’s profitability can be increased. 
The multidivisional corporate structure is also able to extract benefits from an 
increase in the operational efficiency of the firm.  Chandler (1977) concluded that 
multidivisional firms could increase operational efficiency through the establishment of 
a specialised level of management, which was able to focus their entire attention to the 
operation of their division.  This focus by a divisional stratum of management would 
provide increased efficiency and subsequently higher profitability. Indeed, Diamond 
(1984) and Aron (1988) argue that diversification may assist in reducing managerial 
                                                 
1 Berger and Ofek (1995) find that although diversified firms held greater debt levels the increased tax 
shields were not economically significant. Under the Australian imputation system increased benefits 
from debt shields may also be insignificant. 
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agency problems by allowing shareholders to obtain better information about managers 
by comparing divisional performance.  
Penrose (1959), Caves (1981) and Teece (1980, 1982) discuss the benefits that 
could be extracted from the transfer of excess capacity of productive factors if they 
could not be sold efficiently in external factor markets.  Diversification can increase the 
value of a firm through generating economies of scope, so that the firm can reallocate 
the use of firm-specific and rent-bearing assets from one line of business into another.  
Factors of production held by one division in excess of efficient amounts could be 
transferred across to other industry operations held within the diversified firm’s 
portfolio of operations.  However transfer costs would reduce these efficiency gains as 
factors of production are transferred further from their original environment where they 
provided their greatest added value to the diversified firm.  
The diverse scope of the diversified firm’s portfolio of operations also suggests 
that diversified firms are less likely than focussed firms to forgo positive net present 
value investment projects.  Diversified firms have less incentive to sacrifice positive net 
present value investment projects due to the project residing outside the firm’s core 
operations.  Hence, diversified firms can select profit-maximising projects regardless of 
industry specification, rather than being constrained to positive net present value 
investment projects in a specific industry, which may be lower than net present value 
projects in other industries. Evidence that conglomerates efficiently buy and sell 
divisions across industries has been recently noted by Chevalier (2000), Campa and 
Kedia (2000), Graham, Lemmon and Wolf (2001), and Maksimovic and Phillips (2001). 
The third benefit of diversification relates to the integration of multiple 
divisional cash flow streams to form an internal capit al market.  According to Weston 
(1970), Williamson (1975) and Stein (1997) internal capital markets provide value for 
shareholders through the allocation of capital resources from poorly performing 
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divisions, which may be cash-rich, to more efficient divisions when external capital 
market imperfections exist. The establishment of such an internal capital market allows 
the diversified firm to overcome imperfections and transaction costs from sourcing 
finance from external capital markets (Alchian 1969; Weston 1970; Williamson 1970; 
Hubbard 1998).  
Myers and Majluf (1984) show that if the information asymmetry between the 
internal managers and external managers became too great, positive net present value 
investment projects might be forgone.  Hence using internally generated cash flows 
pooled from the diversified firm’s portfolio of operations allow the diversified firm to 
avoid imperfections associated with external financing. Later work by Stein (1997) and 
Fluck and Lynch (1999) demonstrates that the interna l capital market can be efficient 
when centralised headquarters is financially constrained.  The financial constraint 
condition ensures that management will allocate more capital expenditure to divisions 
with the best growth opportunities.  Consequently, management must accept the role of 
‘picking winners’ as the scarce financial resources will dictate that only the most 
efficient projects will be supported. Whited (2001) finds no evidence of inefficient 
allocation of investment, and attributes alternative results (for example, Lamont and 
Polk 2001b) to measurement error. 
 
2.2 Costs: Over-investment, operational inefficiencies and cross-subsidization 
Free cash flow theory states that managers are motivated to over-invest in poor 
investment opportunities rather than return unused borrowings or large free cash flows 
to stakeholders (Jensen 1986; Stulz 1990).  By returning unused borrowings and free 
cash flows to stakeholders, managers reduce the resources under their control.  
Subsequently, when the firm requires further capital to undertake new investment 
projects, management are more likely to incur greater monitoring by external capital 
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markets (Rozeff 1982; Easterbrook 1984).  Internally financed investment projects 
avoid monitoring by external capital markets. 
The motivation by managers to over- invest is driven by agency costs that arise 
from the separation of ownership and control creating an agent-principal relationship 
between manager and stakeholders. Mueller (1969), Jensen (1986) and Shleifer and 
Vishny (1989) discuss the implications of the agency problems resulting from contracts 
not being costlessly written and enforced, thus providing the opportunity for managers 
to act in their own self- interest rather than maximising shareholder wealth.  
Consequently, managers may invest in negative NPV projects in order to extract some 
psychological benefits associated with power and prestige attached to ‘empire-building’ 
(Jensen 1989; Stulz 1990) or in positive (non-maximizing) NPV projects to entrench 
themselves in the firm (Ahimud and Lev 1981; Shleifer and Vishny 1989; Morck, 
Shleifer and Vishny 1990). Empirically, Berger and Ofek (1995) report that diversified 
firms tend to invest more into low growth (low Tobin’s q) industries and that the over-
investment is positively related to the diversification discount.2 
The second cost of diversification arises from the fact that the structure of 
diversified firms may exacerbate operational inefficiencies through information 
asymmetry costs, and agency costs between divisional managers and/or divisional and 
central management. Thus, diversification represents a sub-optimal managerial strategy, 
as the presence of internal (costly) controls does not guarantee that managers will not 
destroy shareholder’s wealth. The reduction in divisional managerial discretion due to 
control rights flowing to central headquarters management creates a disincentive for 
divisional management to maximize divisional operational efficiency (Myerson 1982; 
                                                 
2 Scharfstein (1998) supported the over-investment findings of Berger and Ofek (1995) using a smaller 
sample yet more detailed relatedness measure of diversification.  Scharfstein and Stein (2000) find that 
internal capital market inefficiency leads to over-investment in smaller segments. 
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Harris, Kriebel and Raviv 1982; Gertner, Scharfstein and Stein 1994; Rajan and 
Zingales 1998). Furthermore, the larger the number of projects headquarters must 
oversee and monitor, the greater the agency costs which decreases operational 
efficiency (Rajan, Servaes and Zingales 2000). 
The economic theoretic arguments on the operating inefficiencies resulting from 
diversification have been examined empirically by several researchers. Wernerfelt and 
Montgomery (1988) and Schmalensee (1985) find that narrowly diversified firms earn 
higher levels of profits than widely diversified firms.  Ravenscraft and Scherer (1987) 
investigated mergers in the manufacturing sector during the 1960s and early 1970s and 
find a decrease in the post-acquisition profitability of firms acquired in pure 
conglomerate acquisitions.  John and Ofek (1995) finds that firms which increase their 
focus through assets sales (as measured by the sales-based Herfindahl index) experience 
a significant improvement in operating performance in their remaining asset base during 
the next three-years after the divestiture (see also Klein 1997). 
Thirdly, internal capital markets have been found to not allocate as efficiently as 
expected. Market participants during the 1970s postulated that the operation of an 
efficient internal capital market, which allocated internally generated cash flows into the 
most profitable segments of the diversified firm, was the fundamental basis for creating 
value through corporate diversification.  Indeed, a common feature of studies is the 
consensus that significant cross-subsidization of divisions is present within the 
diversified firm’s portfolio of operations (see Meyer, Milgrom and Roberts 1992; 
Berger and Ofek 1995; Shin and Stulz 1996, 1998; Lamont 1997; Stein 1997; 
Scharfstein 1998; and Schlingemann, Stulz and Walkling 1999).   
Berger and Ofek (1995) reaffirmed market participants’ opinions that cross-
subsidisation reduced shareholder wealth by showing that cross-subsidization accounted 
for 2.9% to 3% of the average value loss in unrelated multi-segment firms. Shin and 
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Stulz (1998) find that segment investment allocation is relatively insensitive to segment 
performance and growth opportunities. Rather the effects of cash flow shortfalls are not 
equally distributed across segments and it is usually the case that segment investment 
budgets are determined by own-segment cash flows regardless of its investment 
opportunities (see also Lamont 1997). More recently, Lamont and Polk (2001b) show 
that diversity in investment opportunities is negatively related to excess value : that 
diversity creates a situation where capital is inefficiently allocated within the firm. 
 
2.3 Empirical evidence of the value of corporate diversification 
The literature on the value of corporate diversification in the 1960s supported 
empirically the benefit arguments presented above. Matsusaka (1993) found that firms 
that undertook diversifying acquisitions (and retained the target’s management) during 
1968, 1971 and 1974, were rewarded with positive abnormal returns (see also Elgers 
and Clark 1980).3 Hubbard and Palia (1999) also observe positive abnormal returns for 
diversifying acquisitions, particularly for financially unconstrained buyers of financially 
constrained targets. 
The valuation of diversified firms as compared to single segment firms also 
demonstrated benefits to diversification in the 1960s. Utilizing a sample of twenty-five 
companies, Klein (1997) found that the U.S. conglomerates were valued at a 9% 
premium to comparable portfolios of single segment firms during 1966-68.4  However, 
his evidence also pointed to the now well-established idea that the late 1960s and early 
1970s marked a break point in the market valuation of diversified firms. Time variation 
in the discount was evident with a discount of 21% from 1966-72, and 36% between 
                                                 
3 The retention of target management aided the diversifying acquirer in extracting managerial synergies 
between the two firms due to target managers holding valuable company specific information. 
 
4 Klein (1997) reported the diversification premium rising to 19% after controlling for operating 
efficiency and leverage. 
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1969-72. Similarly, Servaes (1996) found an average industry adjusted Tobin’s q ratio 
discount of 14% between 1961 and 1970.5 
The evidence on the value of corporate diversification for the 1980s and 1990s 
indicates that conglomerate mergers are not beneficial to shareholders. Rumelt (1974, 
1982), Ravenscraft and Scherer (1987), Bhagat, Shleifer and Vishny (1990) and Kaplan 
and Weisbach (1992) argue that unrelated diversification brought no long-term benefits 
to shareholders or the national economy.  Indeed, academics characterized the corporate 
restructuring of the 1980s as an unravelling of the inefficiencies introduced through the 
merger wave of the 1960s and early 1970s.  Jensen (1989) suggested that diversified 
firms continued to survive only because of the high costs involved with corporate 
control transaction costs for these large diversified firms, which inhibited active 
investors from purchasing and then breaking up the diversified firm.   
Wernerfelt and Montgomery (1988) and Comment and Jarrell (1995) find a 
positive relationship between corporate focus and shareholder wealth due to negative 
economies of scope through the 1980’s. Berger and Ofek (1995) report a significant 
average diversification discount of between 13% and 15% upon diversified firm 
valuations compared to a portfolio of comparable single industry focussed firms during 
1986 to 1991 (see also Servaes 1996).  They find evidence to suggest that the discount 
is caused by costs associated with over- investment and cross-subsidisation within 
diversified firms.  Alternatively, Lang and Stulz (1994) compare diversified firms to 
single industry firms through an analysis of their respective Tobin’s q ratios.  The Lang 
                                                 
5 Klein identifies a combination of structural changes in the US economy to explain the change from 
diversification premium to discount after 1969: the introduction of the Williams Act (1969), removal of 
tax deductibility of convertible bonds and the 1969 anti-trust proceedings against various conglomerates 
contributed to the structural change in the valuation of diversified firms.  The deregulation of broking 
houses which was hypothesized to improve the effective monitoring on conglomerate performance, was 
also cited as another explanatory factor. 
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and Stulz (1994) results suggest that highly diversified firms have significantly lower 
average and median Tobin’s q ratios than single segment firms.6   
The international evidence on the value of diversified firms is less clear cut than 
the US findings.  Khanna and Palepu (1997, 2000) examine the existence of large 
diversified conglomerates in India, concluding that conglomerate internal capital 
markets add value to shareholders in emerging markets.  Firm involvement in large, 
diversified business groupings provided access to international capital markets not 
available otherwise due to substantial information asymmetry between external lenders 
and internal managers (2000, p. 886). Fauver, Houston and Naranjo (1998) study the 
diversification discount across thirty-five countries (developed and developing) between 
1991 and 1995, and conclude that the institutional environment affects the costs and 
benefits of diversification. Specifically, they argue that low income countries present 
conditions for a diversified corporate strategy to benefit shareholders. At odds with 
these two studies is Lins and Servaes (2000) who examine firms from seven emerging 
markets in 1995 (Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, South Korea, and 
Thailand), and show that expropriation of resources in industrial groups (and when 
ownership is relatively concentrated) does lead to a diversification discount. Their 
results also support the argument that institutions and stage of development matter: the 
diversification discount is significantly larger in countries with poorly developed capital 
markets (pp. 19-20). 
The non-US developed economy findings largely support Berger and Ofek 
(1995). Lins and Servaes (1999) investigate diversified firms in the developed 
economies of Germany, Japan and the United Kingdom.  Their study found that 
                                                 
6 Furthermore, Lang and Stulz (1994) find that highly diversified firms have mean and median Tobin’s q 
ratios below one and below the sample mean and median of single segment firms every year from 1978 to 
1990. 
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Japanese diversified firms sold at a discount of approximately 8.35 - 10% compared to 
15.5–15.4% in the United Kingdom during the years 1992 and 1994. The diversification 
discounts for German diversified firms were statistically insignificant.  The Lins and 
Servaes (1999) results for the United Kingdom diversified firms is similar to that 
reported by Berger and Ofek (1995) of 13–15% for United States and is perhaps 
explained by similar institutional market characteristics.  Lins and Servaes (1999) 
argued that concentrated ownership structures increased the benefits of diversification in 
Germany but not in Japan or the UK. Taken together with the emerging economy 
research, the literature to date suggests that the stage of economic development, and 
other country factors may lead to different results on valuing diversified firms. This 
paper therefore contributes to the valuation literature by providing a study of a small 
open, developed economy to test the robustness of previous US and international 
evidence. 
  
3. Method 
 
3.1 Excess value measures 
This paper adopts the valuation methodology developed by Berger and Ofek (1995) to 
value diversified firms.  Firstly, each business segment of the diversified firm is 
matched with an ASX Industry Classification index according to the ASX Industry 
Classification index definition and the description of the segment’s operations and 
product detailed in the company’s annual report.  Three imputed values for each 
diversified firms segment are then calculated by multiplying the segment’s matched 
single-segment firm average industry multiplier with the diversified firm’s segment 
accounting items; Total Assets, Earnings before Tax (EBT), and Total Sales.7  
                                                 
7 The use of EBT differs from Berger and Ofek (1995) who employ earnings before interest and tax 
(EBIT).  The use of EBT was primarily due to its availability across all ASX listed company annual 
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There are three single-segment firm average industry multipliers calculated.  
Each multiplier is constructed by dividing each single segment firm’s total capital in the 
matched industry by three of the single firm’s accounting items: Total Assets, EBT, and 
Total Sales and then calculating the average for the industry. The sum of the imputed 
values of each diversified firm’s segments provides a theoretical value for the firm if all 
of its segments were operated as stand-alone firms.  The natural logarithm of the ratio of 
a diversified firm’s total capital to the sum of each segment’s imputed value provides 
the excess value measure.  A negative excess value measure indicates a diversification 
discount, whilst a positive excess value measure verifies the existence of a premia upon 
the valuation of the diversified firm.   
 
In equation form, 
 )IND(AI)V(I k
n
1i
ijj å
=
=        (1) 
 Excess Value = 
ú
ú
û
ù
ê
ê
ë
é
)I(V
V
ln
j
j  
where, 
 
Vj  = the jth firm’s total capital (market value of all firm equity plus book value of 
firm debt); 
 
I(Vj)  = imputed value of the sum of firm j’s segments; 
 
AIij  = segment i’s value of the accounting items (eg. Sales, Earnings before Tax 
and Assets) used in the valuation multiple for firm j; 
 
INDk  = multiple of total capital to an accounting item AIk (eg. Sales, Earnings before 
Tax and Assets) for the average or median single segment firm k in segment 
i’s industry. 
 
                                                 
reports whilst EBIT was only obtainable in a smaller number of ASX listed company annual reports, 
therefore to retain consistency through the study, EBT was used.  Unfortunately, interest expense could 
not be added back to EBT because segmental interest expense allocations are not required under AASB 
1005 and therefore Australian listed firms do not disclose this information. 
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Consistent with Berger and Ofek (1995), extreme outlier single segment sales, EBT and 
assets multipliers are excluded from the calculation of average and median industry 
ratios so as not to distort the imputed valuations of the diversified firms.8  In this study 
an extreme value is defined as multiples that were located in the upper and lower 2.5% 
of the data (that is, a 5%-trimmed data set).9 
 
3.2 Matching firms using the Australian industry classification system 
ASX Industry Classification indices are equivalent to U.S two-digit Securities Industry 
Classification (SIC) groupings. Unfortunately, ASX Industry Classification sub-
groupings equivalent to three-digit SIC groupings were only introduced in 1994.  
Further, in order to obtain industry groupings with at least five firms of sufficient size 
(generating sales revenue greater than $20 million), two-digit SIC were used for the full 
sample period 1988-98.10 Each diversified firm segment was matched to single segment 
firms in the same classification. 11 
3.3 Regression models 
                                                 
8 Berger and Ofek (1995) define extreme values in arbitrary fashion as those observations for which 
actual value of a firm is four times the imputed value or less than one-fourth the imputed value. 
 
9 All regressions were run with the full data set and no discernible difference in results was obtained. 
 
10 A minimum $20 million sales revenue is set as a size benchmark in order to eliminate small firms 
which may distort valuation multiples (see Berger and Ofek 1995 for a similar technique). 
 
11 Although the use of industry classification codes are standard in the literature, there are two generally 
accepted limitations (see Scharfstein 1998).  Firstly, even though two separate segments of a diversified 
firm may be in two different two-digit SIC indices they can still both produce related products and 
provide related services in the same industries.  Secondly, vertical connections/integration between two 
segments within a diversified firm diminish the ability of two-digit SIC groupings to distinguish different 
industry exposures.  See also Chevalier (2000, pp. 3-4).  During 1997, the ASX restructured the ASX 
Industry Classification indices by introducing three new industry groups (Infrastructure and Utilities, 
Telecommunications and Healthcare and Biotechnology) and subsequently reassigning listed companies 
into these new industry groups. The Oil and Gas ASX Industry group was also renamed Energy.  
Restructuring of the ASX Industry Classification indices have been incorporated into the matching of 
diversified firm segments and ASX Industry Classification groupings. Thus the restructuring has no effect 
upon the imputed values of the segments. 
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Once an industry multiplier is calculated and each segment is matched by ASX industry 
code, the imputed value for the diversified firm is calculated. An imputed value of each 
single segment firm is also calculated. In order to identify a diversification discount or 
premium the Berger and Ofek (1995, pp. 49-52) OLS regression model is estimated: 
 Ln(Vj /I(Vj)) = a+ß1(Diversified)+ß2(Ln(TAj))+ß3(Earningsj)+ß4(CapExpj)+ej   (2) 
where, 
 Ln (Vj /I(Vj))  = excess value measure for firm j; 
Diversified   = a dummy variable with value 1 for a diversified firm, 0 otherwise; 
Ln(TAj) = the natural logarithm of total assets for firm j; 
Earningsj  = earnings before tax scaled by total sales for firm j; 
CapExpj  = capital expenditure scaled by total sales for firm j. 
A significant ß1 coefficient in equation (2) indicates that diversified firms are 
valued differently to single segment firms: a negative value indicates a discount, and a 
positive value a premium. Note that equation (2) also controls for firm size (natural 
logarithm of total assets), profitability (earnings before tax to sales) and growth 
opportunities (capital expenditure to sales) which may be associated with firms trading 
at values different from their imputed value (whether single segment or diversified) 
(Berger and Ofek 1995; Lins and Servaes 1999; 2000). 
 
4. Sample 
 
4.1 Sample selection procedure 
In order to investigate the market value of diversified firms and allow for the possibility 
of time variation, a sample of ASX listed companies was selected that comprised firms 
that had maintained a diversified multi-segment corporate structure over the sample 
period of 1988-98.  Specifically, every sample company had to operate a segment in at 
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least two industries with different 2-digit ASX Industry Classification codes during the 
ten-year sample period. 
The following procedures were involved in selecting the sample of diversified firms: 
1. Examination of all company annual report segmental information within the 
Australian Graduate School of Management (AGSM) Annual Report Microfiche 
File in 1988 to identify firms that qualified under the definition of a diversified firm; 
2. Examination of the annual report segmental information for qualifying companies 
over the sample period from 1988 to 1998, to determine whether the firm retained 
their diversified multi-segment structure over the sample period.  Only diversified 
firms which remained listed over the entire sample period were selected. 
 
Inclusion in the final sample was dependent upon the diversified firms providing a 
complete financial information set including complete and reliable segmental financial 
information, all profit and loss statements, and balance sheet information used to 
construct the independent and excess value variables. To ensure data integrity, and to be 
consistent with Berger and Ofek (1995), the sum of segment sales must be within 1% of 
total sales and segment allocated assets must comprise 75% of the diversified firms total 
assets. The sample selection procedure resulted in 24 diversified firms and 221 single 
segment firms, and a cross-section and time series pooled data set of 1615 
observations.12 This data set was then used to calculate excess value measures and to 
identify extreme values. The removal of extreme values provides 1137 data points on 
226 companies (including all 24 diversified firms) for analysis.13 
                                                 
12 The number of single segment firms varies during the period as firms enter and exit the single segment 
control portfolio. A list of the diversified firms matched to industry segments, and the firms in the control 
portfolios, is available from the authors upon request. 
 
13 As stated in section 3.1, extreme values are defined as the upper and lower 2.5% of the distribution.  
This procedure is more consistent than the ad hoc approach adopted by Berger and Ofek (1995, p. 61). 
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4.2 Data sources 
Fundamental to the investigation of diversified firm valuations was the availability of 
segmental information for all diversified firms in the sample. The introduction of 
Australian Accounting Standard “AASB 1005 – Financial Reporting by Segments” for 
the financial years that ended on or after 30th June 1986, provided for the disclosure of 
segmental financial information by Australian listed companies and subsidiaries of 
foreign listed companies in their annual reports.  Companies subject to AASB 1005 are 
required to report segment Sales Revenues, Total Assets and EBT for all material 
segments under the company’s control. 14 Segmental financial information was obtained 
from the AGSM Annual Report Microfiche File (1988-1992) and Connect 4 Annual 
Report Collection (1993-1998).15 
The construction of comparable portfolios of stand-alone single segment firms 
required financial statement information for all industry matched single-segment ASX 
listed companies during the period 1988 to 1998. The information set included the profit 
and loss statement items of sales, operating profit before taxation as well as the balance 
sheet items of total assets, non-current borrowings and current borrowings. This 
financial information data set was obtained through the AGSM and Connect 4. 
Datastream was used for market values for all single segment and diversified firms. 
 
                                                 
 
14 The materiality of a segment to the company or group of companies as a whole can be measured in 
terms of revenue, profits or losses generated, or assets employed.  In the absence of other factors, a 
segment would be considered material if one or more of the following conditions applied:- (a) its revenue 
is 10 per cent or more of the total segment revenue of all segments (including inter-segment sales and 
transfers); (b) the absolute amount of its segment result is 10 per cent or more of the greater, in absolute 
amount, of: (i) the total segment result of all segments that earned a profit; and, (ii) the total segment 
result of all segments that incurred a loss; and/or, (c) its segment assets are 10 per cent or more of the 
total segment assets of all segments.  [AASB 1005.10, Commentary - paragraph (ix), 29th April 1986]. 
 
15 Both the AGSM and the CONNECT4 data were used as neither database covered the entire sample 
period from 1988 to 1998. 
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4.3 Sample Characteristics 
Table 1 provides descriptive statistics for the whole sample and the single and 
diversified firm samples. The average firm size (market capitalisation of equity) is $1.3 
billion.  
 
Table 1 
Sample characteristics 
About here 
 
Table 1 also indicates that the average diversified firm is approximately 4 times larger 
than single segment firms in terms of market capitalisation, and 3.5 times larger in terms 
of total assets.  However, median data and skewness and kurtosis values indicate that 
the single segment firm data is influenced heavily by outliers. Comparison of median 
data shows that diversified firms are approximately 13 times larger in terms of market 
capitalisation and total assets. Sales data reinforce these relativities. 
Diversified firms generate an average (median) earnings before tax 6 (14) times 
greater than single segment firms, or $456.7 ($195.7) million pa compared to $75.6 
($14.3) million pa. The average return on equity before tax (EBT divided by market 
value of equity) for single segment firms was 8.8% pa compared to diversified firms 
with 13.5% pa. Again this data is influenced by outlier values, and the median ten-year 
return on equity of 10.7% pa for single segments and 10.9% pa for diversified firms 
shows little difference between the two sub-samples. Return on assets provide similar 
results: diversified firms generate a ten-year median return of 8.7% pa compared to the 
8.6% pa of single segment firms. Such data is not consistent with recent literature by 
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Comment and Jarrell (1995) and Berger and Ofek (1995) which show that focussed 
firms are generally more profitable. 
Growth measures such as median capital expenditure-to-sales (or total assets) 
indicate that single segment firms have higher capital expenditures (capital expenditure-
to-sales of 0.6% pa compared to 0.02% pa, and capital expenditure-to-total assets of 
0.7% pa compared to 0.02% pa). Median market-to-book (market value of equity to 
total assets) ratios are similar for the two types of firm (singles = 0.8039; diversified = 
0.7972).  Finally, the diversified firms have on average (median) 3.9 (4) segments. 
 
5. Results 
This section presents the valuation of diversified firms and tests for the existence of a 
diversification discount or premium after controlling for size, profitability and growth. 
The valuation of diversified firms is measured using three excess value measures which 
were obtained using three multipliers (Sales revenue, Earnings before Tax (EBT), and 
Total Assets). In addition, we calculate excess value measures for each single segment 
firm and use this data in regression models. 
 
5.1 Excess value results 
Table 2 reports univariate excess value results for diversified and single segment firms 
for the full data set 1988-98. As in Berger and Ofek (1995, p. 48), single segment firm 
excess values are used to check the distributional properties of the multipliers. It is 
expected that the excess value measures for single segment firms are relatively 
symmetrical around zero. Examination of the results shows that median excess values 
behave more consistently than average excess values, with single segment values having 
a median close to zero with lighter tails than a normal distribution. Indeed, it is possible 
to show that average excess values for single segment firms should always by negative 
  
 
21 
and that medians are a better locator for the excess value calculations.16 Median excess 
values are used in all subsequent analysis. 
 
Table 2 
Excess value  summary statistics 
About here 
 
From Table 2 the median excess value of diversified firms is higher (more positive) than 
single segments for sales and assets multipliers, and lower for the EBT multiplier. This 
is consistent with international evidence that suggests that diversified firms are just as 
likely to trade at premiums as discounts, but that diversified firms are more likely to 
perform poorly as compared to single segment firms (this is captured in the EBT 
multiplier). Indeed, many diversification studies focus only on the assets and sales 
multipliers (for example, Lins and Servaes 1999, 2000; Campa and Kedia 2000; 
Graham, Lemmon and Wolf 2001) and use relative earnings as a variable in explaining 
the cross sectional variation in discounts. Given the lack of studies on diversification for 
Australia, this paper has erred on the side of caution and documents all three excess 
value measures in the first instance. By definition, the EBT multiplier uses earnings as 
the basis for calculating excess value, so that if diversified firms are also poor 
performers then the excess value measure will be negatively biased.  Thus any 
regression with the EBT excess value will not tell us if it is diversified firms per se or 
                                                 
16 Berger and Ofek (1995) use multipliers from median single segment firm data, with no justification for 
the choice of median over average. Other researchers have solved the negative bias of the average 
multiplier by using weights (for example, total assets or total sales; see Lamont and Polk 2001a, pp. 5-6). 
Given the calculation method for determining excess value it is possible to show that the average industry 
multipliers for single segment firms should always be negative. 
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poor performing diversified firms that leads to a discount. This problem is examined in 
more detail in section 6. 
 
5.2 Cross-sectional regressions 
The regression estimation (equation 2; p. 15) is a replication of Berger and Ofek (1995, 
pp. 47-52) and is reported in Table 3. Each regression uses a different excess value 
measures as the dependent variable. In cases where assets and EBT are used in the 
excess value measures, the related explanatory variable (for assets: the natural logarithm 
of total assets, and for EBT: earnings-to-sales) is removed from the model to avoid 
model misspecification. 
 
Table 3 
Regression results for the market value of diversified firms  
About here 
 
The regression results in Table 3 are in conflict on the excess value of diversified firms. 
While all models are highly significant they do not explain a large amount of the 
variation in excess value. The Diversified indicator variable is significantly positive for 
the assets multiplier, insignificant for the sales multiplier and significantly negative for 
the EBT multiplier. The best performing model (in terms of R2) is from the sales excess 
value multiplier (R2» 13% and F-statistic = 41.86). This indicates that diversified firms 
are trading at approximately their imputed value (the diversification indicator variable 
equals zero) – firms with higher earnings (Earnings) and more growth opportunities 
(CapExp) are more likely to have higher excess values.  
Table 3 shows that the other variables used in the regressions have consistent 
signs and are consistent with Berger and Ofek (1995) and subsequent studies (for 
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example, Lins and Servaes 1999). The intercepts are on average zero for the single 
segment firms (with the except of a marginally significant negative intercept for EBT). 
Ln(TA) (Size) is positive in the sales and EBT regressions, and Earnings is positive and 
significant in the assets and sales regressions. 
One reason for the inconsistent coefficients on the diversified variable across the 
regressions could be time variation in the value of diversified firms.  To consider the 
effect of pooling the time series data three different approaches are employed.17 The 
first is to run regressions with dummy variables on each year. If any year shows a 
significant result it indicates that the imputed value for single segment firms in that year 
is different from other years, implying the year is different from others and a potential 
time-varying effect is present.  For the asset excess value and sales excess value none of 
the year dummies were significant, suggesting that no one year is driving the results for 
the imputed values of single segment firms. With the EBT excess value regression only 
1992 and 1997 showed significant coefficients, (and then only at the 10% level).  This 
suggests that the EBT excess value measure is affected, albeit only slightly, by time 
variation.  The second approach is to run each regression each year.  As expected the 
results for any one particular year are not as strong as the results for the pooled sample. 
However, there was only one variable (the diversified indicator variable) in one year 
(1990) where the coefficient was significantly different and opposite in sign to the 
pooled result. The coefficients for each year on all variables were either the same sign 
and significant as the pooled result or insignificant.  This indicates that no one particular 
year is necessarily driving the results for the pooled data.  The third approach is to fit a 
regression for each of the excess value multipliers with year dummies which are 
interacted with each of the predictors in the model. This will show if the year dummies 
                                                 
17 Results from all three approaches are available on request. 
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are having any significant effect on the response excess values (as with the first 
approach) and also if the predictors are varying significantly from year to year. The 
results for the asset excess value and the sales excess value regressions indicate that 
none of the individual year dummies are significant (as expected from the results of the 
first approach) and none of the interaction terms are significant. This indicates that none 
of the assets excess values and sales excess values for each year and for the single and 
diversified firms, are significantly different from any other year. The regression for the 
EBT excess value model indicates that diversified firms in 1996 have a significant 
effect on the pooled regression.  Data for 1996 was removed from the sample and the 
regressions re-run but the effect of 1996 was not sufficient to change the sign or 
significance of the coefficient of the diversified EBT model. Therefore, the effect of 
time variation was not considered sufficient to explain the inconsistent results across the 
three different models. 
The consistent relationship between size and excess value, and earnings and 
excess value, provides another potential explanation for the inconsistent results in Table 
3.  If the diversified firms in this sample are also likely to be poor performers then the 
results of the EBT excess value multiplier are mis-specified. This proposition is 
examined in the next section. 
 
6. The diversification discount and the performance of diversified firms  
 
Recent research on the diversification discount has pointed to a sample bias problem 
that is caused by the coincidence of firms with a diversified corporate structure and poor 
performance. Such a relationship leads to difficulties in interpreting the diversification 
discount, especially when using the EBT multiplier. Lang and Stulz (1994) and Campa 
and Kedia (2000) show that diversified firms are poor performers prior to 
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diversification. Lamont and Polk (2001a) document a negative relationship between 
excess value and subsequent returns; the discount merely “reflects the well-known value 
effect in stocks” rather than a valuation of the diversification strategy (p. 27). Similarly, 
Campa and Kedia (2000) argue that the observed correla tion between diversification 
and negative excess value is not casual once the choice to diversify is controlled for (see 
also Chevalier 2000; Graham, Lemmon and Wolf 2001). Poor performance leads to 
firms trading at a discount relative to other firms regardless of corporate structure. 
Finally, Lins and Servaes (2000) control for the profitability of diversified firms in 
cross-sectional analysis of excess value and find that there is a significant positive 
relationship between excess value and diversified firm profitability. 
Given the research reviewed above, we expect that diversification and 
profitability are both important explanatory variables in any excess value calculations. 
In order to disentangle these influences, we re-estimate a multiple regression model 
using an excess profitability measure and interaction terms as variables to explain the 
variation in the asset and sales excess values (see equation 3 below). The definition of 
excess profitability used by Lins and Servaes (2000) is adopted, although we provide a 
more robust interaction model than those authors in the regression analysis. First, the 
excess profitability of each single segment and diversified firm is calculated as the 
difference between actual profitability (EBT-to-sales ratio) and implied profitability.  
For single segment firms implied profitability is taken as the median industry EBT-to-
sales ratio. Implied profitability for each diversified firms is determined as the sum of 
each matched median industry portfolio profitability weighted by the proportion of sales 
in each segment. This definition controls for differences in industry profitability. Firms 
performing better than the industry median will have positive excess profitability, and 
firms below the industry median will have negative profitability. 
Regression (3) is defined as follows: 
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Ln(Vj/I(Vj)) = a + ß1(Excess Profitj) + ß2(Diversified) + ß3(EP*Div) +  
 ß4(Ln(TAj)) + ß5(CapExpj) + e  (3) 
where,  
Excess Profitj  = actual minus implied profitability;  
EP*Div  = an interaction term capturing the excess profitability of diversified 
firms;  
Ln (Vj /I(Vj)), Diversified, Ln(TAj), Earningsj, and CapExpj are as defined in 
equation (2) above.  
 
If profitability tempers the diversification discount then it is expected that good 
performing diversified firms should be valued at a higher premium or a lower discount 
than poor performing diversified firms (ß1+ ß3 > 0). In addition, as seen in the results for 
regressions (2) and (3), ß1 should be positive indicating that more profitable firms trade 
at a higher excess value than less profitable firms. The expected signs for ß4 and ß5 are 
also positive. 
 
Table 4 
 
Regressions for the relationship between the diversification discount and 
profitability 
 
About here 
 
Table 4 reports results of two estimations of regression (3). Models 1 and 2 estimate the 
main effect and interaction term and include control variables for firm size and growth 
opportunities. Both models are significant at the 1% level, and provide consistent 
results. The market values for diversified firms are higher than imputed values for the 
assets multiplier and equal to imputed values for the sales multiplier.  Excess profit is an 
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important determinant of the excess value for single segment firms, with excess 
profitability firms having a higher excess value. Further, ß2 is significantly positive in 
Model 1 and insignificant in Model 2 reinforcing our results for assets and sales excess 
values in the previous section. 
 The signs of the coefficients are as expected and two issues are worth noting. 
First, diversified firms that are high performers also have a higher diversification 
premium than other diversified firms given that ß1+ ß3 > 0. However, using the sales 
excess value variable ß1+ ß3 < 0 (marginally). Combined with no significant difference 
between single segment and diversified firms we are not concerned with this counter-
intuitive result. Second, there is a negative relationship between size and the excess 
value measure due to the construction of the assets multiplier (where total asset appear 
on the denominator of the multiplier). The results of Model 1 are robust to the exclusion 
of this variable.18  
 
                                                 
18 Coefficients and t-statistics in brackets as follows: a=0.0093 (0.65); ß1=1.4052 (7.83**);  ß2=0.1523 
(4.41**); ß3= -1.1238 (-3.02**); ß5=-0.0001 (-0.97); R
2=0.0684, F-statistic=20.77**). 
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6. Conclusions  
 
Berger and Ofek (1995) is a commonly cited paper for assessing the effect of 
diversification on firm value.  This current paper begins with their method using 
Australian data from 1988 until 1998.  Mixed evidence is found for the diversification 
discount.  Using three measures in the calculation of the excess value (assets, sales and 
earnings before tax) we find that diversified firms are just as likely to trade at premiums 
as discounts, but that diversified firms are more likely to perform poorly relative to 
single segment firms.  To disentangle performance and diversification we construct a 
regression model using an excess profitability measure and interaction terms as 
variables to explain the inconsistencies. If profitability tempers the diversification 
discount then it is expected that good performing diversified firms should be valued at a 
higher premium or a lower discount than poor performing diversified firms.  Indeed we 
find that diversified firms that are high performers also have a higher diversification 
premium than other diversified firms and we also find that excess profit is an important 
determinant of the excess value for single segment firms. 
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Table 1 
 
Sample characteristics  
 
This table reports sample characteristics for the whole sample (N=1137), and the single segment (N=924) 
and diversified (N=213) firm samples. Financial information was obtained from the AGSM Annual 
Report Microfiche File (1988-1992) and Connect 4 Annual Report Collection (1993-1998). 
 
  
Total Assets 
($m) 
MV of 
equity 
($m) 
CapExp 
($m) 
Total Sales 
($m) 
EBT 
($m) 
Number 
Segments 
Whole sample  Mean 1715.77 1331.84 25.60 1380.17 146.96 1.55
 Median 249.01 194.77 0.46 255.00 21.66 1
 Std Dev 4518.84 4331.36 113.67 2900.94 596.06 1.29
 Skewness 5.80 12.17 9.30 3.81 15.18 2.42
 Kurtosis 41.69 225.46 108.40 16.33 288.81 5.04
 Min 7.60 0.02 0 18.80 -101.70 1
 Max 54484.00 97142.75 1678.00 21189.00 12824.30 7
 N 1137 1137 1137 1137 1137 1137
        
  
Single Firms Mean 1146.46 857.49 31.47 1012.09 75.55 1
 Median 166.13 133.56 1.15 190.45 14.30 1
 Std Dev 3676.20 3782.01 125.37 2523.67 233.86 0
 Skewness 8.03 18.98 8.40 4.41 10.24 N.A.
 Kurtosis 83.05 460.68 88.17 21.35 155.09 N.A.
 Min 7.60 0.02 0 20.09 -60.60 1
 Max 54484.00 97142.75 1678.00 19224.80 4468.00 1
 N 924 924 924 924 924 924
        
        
Diversified Mean 4185.44 3389.60 0.13 2976.92 456.74 3.94
 Median 2238.20 1784.38 0.36 1907.00 195.70 4
 Std Dev 6560.52 5746.24 0.30 3770.04 1243.80 1.37
 Skewness 3.20 3.76 3.66 2.79 7.98 0.54
 Kurtosis 10.69 15.80 13.85 8.60 72.04 -0.54
 Min 15.55 4.48 0 18.80 -101.70 2
 Max 37082.00 37039.01 1.70 21189.00 12824.30 7
 N 213 213 213 213 213 213
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Table 2 
 
Excess value summary statistics  
 
This table shows the summary statistics for the excess value measures for the whole sample, and the 
single segment and diversified firm samples. 
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where, 
 
Vj  = the jth firm’s total capital (market value of all firm equity plus book value of firm debt);  
 
I(Vj)  = imputed value of the sum of firm j’s segments; 
 
AIij  = segment i’s value of the accounting items (eg. Sales, Earnings before Tax and Assets) used in 
the valuation multiple for firm j; 
 
INDk  = multiple of total capital to an accounting item AIk (eg. Sales, Earnings before Tax and Assets) 
for the average or median single segment firm k  in segment i’s industry. 
 
 
Average Median 
  EBT Assets Sales EBT Assets Sales 
Whole 
sample Mean -0.2067 -0.0408 -0.2003 0.0524 0.0602 0.0431
 Median -0.2102 -0.0484 -0.1483 0.0000 0.0119 0.0184
 Std Dev 0.7506 0.4166 0.6268 0.5493 0.4197 0.6135
 Skewness 0.1717 -0.1878 -0.3233 0.5304 0.1380 0.0105
 Kurtosis 0.0219 0.8525 0.0195 1.3749 1.2367 0.4842
 Min -1.9067 -1.7045 -1.9567 -1.8573 -1.5838 -1.8907
 Max 1.9024 1.3824 1.3711 1.9345 1.8355 1.8695
 N 1137 1137 1137 1137 1137 1137
        
Single 
Firms Mean -0.1672 -0.0657 -0.1887 0.0921 0.0339 0.0407
 Median -0.1692 -0.0597 -0.1493 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
 Std Dev 0.7465 0.4174 0.6317 0.5624 0.4187 0.6208
 Skewness 0.0906 -0.2922 -0.3403 0.4786 0.0795 0.0094
 Kurtosis -0.0297 0.8529 0.0594 1.3251 1.4001 0.4969
 Min -1.9067 -1.7045 -1.9567 -1.8573 -1.5838 -1.8907
 Max 1.9024 1.3824 1.3711 1.9345 1.8355 1.8695
 N 924 924 924 924 924 924
        
Diversified Mean -0.3782 0.0674 -0.2505 -0.1199 0.1743 0.0534
 Median -0.4697 -0.0046 -0.1483 -0.1830 0.1042 0.0920
 Std Dev 0.7460 0.3964 0.6039 0.4503 0.4057 0.5822
 Skewness 0.5543 0.3921 -0.2680 0.5068 0.4791 0.0237
 Kurtosis 0.7180 0.2552 -0.1407 1.2874 0.2935 0.3954
 Min -1.8864 -0.8880 -1.8567 -1.5190 -0.7834 -1.6245
 Max 1.8806 1.3126 1.2862 1.5803 1.3743 1.7919
 N 213 213 213 213 213 213
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Table 3 
Regression results for the market value of diversified firms  
 
This table reports OLS regression results for: 
Ln (Vj /I(Vj)) = a + ß1(Diversified) + ß2(Ln(TA j)) + ß3(Earningsj) + ß4(CapExp j) + ej.  
where 
 Ln (Vj /I(Vj)) = the Assets, Sales and EBT excess value measures for firm j respectively;  
Diversified   = a dummy variable with value 1 for a diversified firm, 0 otherwise;  
Ln(TA j) = the natural logarithm of total assets for firm j;  
Earningsj  = earnings before tax scaled by total sales for firm j;  
CapExp j  = capital expenditure scaled by total sales for firm j.  
 
Standard errors are reported in parentheses. * and ** indicate significance at the 10% and 5% 
respectively. 
 
 Assets excess value Sales excess value EBT excess value 
Variable  Coeff t-stat Coeff t-stat Coeff t-stat 
       
Intercept -0.0246 
(0.0180) 
-1.36 -0.3775 
(0.1327) 
-2.85 -0.2228 
(0.1254) 
-1.78* 
Diversified 0.1285 
(0.0317) 
4.05** -0.0276 
(0.0491) 
-0.56 -0.2599 
(0.0464) 
-5.60** 
Ln(TA)   0.0173 
(0.0108) 
1.61 0.0253 
(0.0101) 
2.51** 
Earnings 0.5891 
(0.1168) 
5.05** 1.7576 
(0.1639) 
10.72**   
CapExp -0.0001 
(0.0001) 
-0.57 0.0007 
(0.0002) 
3.92** 0.0001 
(0.0002) 
0.47 
       
R2 0.0389  0.1289  0.0286  
F-statistic  15.28**  41.86**  11.12**  
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Table 4 
 
Regressions for the relationship between the diversification discount and 
profitability 
This table reports OLS regression results for: 
 Ln (Vj /I(Vj)) = a + ß1(Excess Profit j) + ß2(Diversified) + ß3(EP*Div) + ß4(Ln(TA j)) + ß5(CapExp j)+ e 
 
where 
Ln (Vj /I(Vj))  = the Assets, Sales and EBT excess value measures for firm j respectively;  
Excess Profit j  = the difference between actual and implied profit for firm j;  
Diversified  = a dummy variable with value 1 for a diversified firm, 0 otherwise;  
EP*Div  = an interaction term capturing the excess profitability of diversified firms;  
Ln(TA j) = the natural logarithm of total assets for firm j;  
Earningsj  = earnings before tax scaled by total sales for firm j;  
CapExp j  = capital expenditure scaled by total sales for firm j.  
Standard errors are reported in parentheses. * and ** indicate significance at the 10% and 5% 
respectively. 
 
 Model 1 
Assets EV 
Model 2 
Sales EV 
Variable Coeff t-stat Coeff t-stat 
Intercept 0.2407 
(0.0942) 
2.55** -0.4575 
(0.1248) 
-3.67** 
Excess Profit  (ß1) 1.4053 
(0.1790) 
7.85** 4.0746 
(0.2372) 
17.18** 
Diversified  (ß2) 0.1869 
(0.0372) 
5.03** 0.0502 
(0.0492) 
1.02 
EP*Div  (ß3) -1.0353 
(0.3734) 
-2.77** -4.0997 
(0.4947) 
-8.29** 
Ln(TA)  (ß4) -0.0188 
(0.0076) 
-2.48** 0.0322 
(0.0100) 
3.21** 
CapExp  (ß5) -0.0001 
(0.0001) 
-0.69 0.0005 
(0.0002) 
3.25** 
     
R2 0.0734  0.2390  
F-statistic  17.92**  71.03**  
  
 
